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A Formative Shakespearean Legacy: Elizabethan Views of God, Fortune, and War
SHAKESPEARE'S INTELLECTUAL legacies
tended not to be easy ones. The most rewarding of them were encumbered by changing or conflicting points of view. Instead of giving easy answers to philosophical questions, they placed upon Shakespeare the burden of artistic and intellectual resolution. The result is that he was never comfortably bound by a tradition, any more than he was by a source. Indeed, he was compelled to give more to the tradition than the tradition gave to him. Such is the case, in all respects, with the legacy to be explored in the present essay. One of the first legacies to which Shakespeare was impelled to give dramatic form, it is the one of which he was most aware when he was writing his historical tetralogies, and I shall limit its application to these plays. Such a limitation has the advantage of concentrating upon Shakespeare during a period that, for most writers, is formative. He was experimenting with important philosophical problems, including those with lasting effect upon the structure and the manner of achieving the outcome of his later plays.
The philosophical problem that, in its formulation by divines, historians, and soldiers, I consider to be one of Shakespeare's first and most formative legacies is that of the relationship of God, Fortune, and war. In the Renaissance, this legacy emphasized the question of how much latitude could be given to human prowess, as opposed to supernatural ordinance, in determining victory or defeat in battle. This legacy was especially crucial for the history plays because in them military victory or defeat is of ultimate importance. It was equally crucial in the ways it could influence the significance of characterization. If Fortune happened to be dominant, human character would be relatively insignificant in the meaningless chaos of battle. When Fortune came to be placed either in contrast with God or precariously under the control of God, moral confusion occurred, and the resultant tension was conducive, in the hands of a thoughtful dramatist, to a fuller exploration of man's dilemma in trying to be morally responsible in a world still apparently subject to chance. When Fortune yielded place entirely to God, victory in battle was determined solely by divine authority, with a reduction in individual responsibility and, usually in the drama, in the importance of characterization. The maximum amount of human importance comes when there is still a belief in supernatural influence combined with a growing, and often conflicting, emphasis upon human involvement in the outcome. This is the stage in the growth of the legacy that proved most conducive to Shakespeare's achievement in the second tetralogy.
Although these stages in the development of the legacy could coexist in time and although Shakespeare was not tied to any single aspect of the legacy that was currently topical, I do suggest that my ordering of the stages has a significant chronological basis. Shakespeare could of course draw upon whatever theory of war was suggested by his historical sources, notably those related to divine providence as recently studied by Henry Ansgar Kelly.' More important, he could draw upon the concept, regardless of when he was writing, that was dramatically most responsive to the subject with which he was working. The poet, as Sidney recognized, is philosophically superior to the philosopher and historically superior to the historian.
One may acknowledge all these considerations and still venture to look respectfully at the ways in which England was emotionally and thoughtfully reacting to crucial wars. One may be a topical critic, concerned with the history of ideas, without being a fanatical one. David Bevington has recently guided historical scholars in the proper direction by cautioning against too literal a topical identification and at the same time suggesting that we seek a "polemical norm." I take particular en-222 couragement, as well as caution, from a controlling idea which disciplines his book: "The burning issues of the 1590's were relevant to Shakespeare's career as a dramatist, not in terms of individual identities but of principles."2 Shakespeare could ignore these burning issues only by ignoring his audience. He could ignore the principles behind the issues only at the expense of his own development as a dramatic thinker in the mainstream of contemporary thought.
Although it was not at first a crucially topical part of the legacy, the inherited classical tradition of Fortune was to become a vital beginning for Elizabethan thought on the worth of human resourcefulness in war. It is not force of frendship nor of might, But god that causeth thinges to fro or frame. Not wit, but lucke, doth wield the winners game.6
In an earlier work, William Patten's The Expedicion into Scotlande . . . of Edward, Duke of Somerset (London, 1548), the confusion is more painfully meditated. Patten writes with the authority of a soldier, and his perplexity reveals the soulsearching that must have characterized actual warfare. His Preface attempts to give due prominence simultaneously to Somerset's "valiance and wisdome," to Fortune, and to "almightie God." Fortune is used because Somerset was fortunate and because "we must be content in commune speche to use the termes of our formers devised." Patten first reaches an ambivalent rejection, "remembring my religion, and what fortunes force is," and finally in the body of the work he girds himself to reject Fortune entirely. In the manner of many other practical writers, he attributes the successful outcome both to "gods bounty" and to his hero's "valiance and pollecie" (sigs. L2v-L3r), written by the most sufficient of merely human Sometime the flood prevails, and then the wind; authors," for "it setteth down expressly the true Now one the better, then another best;
and first causes of all that happened; not imputing Both tugging to be victors, breast to breast, the death of Ahab to his over-forwardness in Yet neither conqueror nor conquered:
battle, the ruin of his family to the security of So is the equal poise of this fell war.
Jeroboan in Jezriel, nor the victories of Hazael to Here on this molehill will I sit me down.t commotions raised in Israel by the comTo whom God will, there be the victory!.
(3H6 II.V7-15) -ng of Jehu; but referring all unto the will of God, I mean, to his revealed will." For the historian Henry's pious conclusion suggests that Shakethere is an awesome sense of theme and destiny in speare, after having used Fortune to full dramatic such a view of war. But Ralegh concludes this dispurpose, was shaping the trilogy in a similar direccussion with a sentence that makes this historiotion: God would finally prevail over a Fortune as graphical theory not an unmixed blessing for either morally irresponsible as the sea. the historian or the historical dramatist: "True it The saintly king, consistently attributing events is, that the concurrences of second causes with to God, might be superficially seen as a futile and their effects, is in these books nothing largely militarily defeated agent in war. Shakespeare did described, nor perhaps exactly in any of those hisnot, I am convinced, so see him. With more histories that are in these points most copious."10 torical and religious perspective than any other Second causes, usually the human agents of warcharacter in the plays, Henry is aware of the futilfare, cannot under this benevolent theory be of ity not only of human effort but even of the much importance. Accordingly, not only must the Fortune that mocks it. When he is freed by Warnarrative suffer, but less emphasis can be placed wick, he correctly sees that God was the "author" upon purposeful character. Nevertheless, since deand Warwick the "instrument" (3H6 iv.vi.18). feat in war is attributed to moral defects in inHis most perceptive comment upon human redividuals and nations, a more probing social insponsibility in a hopeless series of battles is that vestigation is encouraged. Only massive documentation could convey the powerful hold that this wholly nontactical, nonpolitical, and noneconomic theory of war had upon the people. Some idea of its force can be gleaned from writings during and immediately following the Armada crisis. It was then, surely, that theory would be tested in most urgent military and emotional needs. In June of 1588, just months before the Armada, John Carpenter called for an almost totally nonmilitary preparation for the invasion, with prayer and fasting. Weapons and strong walls are meaningless, for "the strength of the Lord is farre above the myght of man." A representative assurance in this work is that the few and the weak can, with God's favor, prevail against great odds.14 In March of 1588, the able biblical scholar John Udall had made the case against military agency even stronger: such preparations and devices "rather make worse that whiche they would helpe," for they are "framed in the shop of humane pollicy only." Englishmen should remember that "everie breach in a state" is due to "the displeasure of the Lorde for the contempt or neglect of his holy commandements."'15
This theory was not, as the mean-spirited critic today might suspect, urged only by divines in support of their crusade against sin. Queen Elizabeth, in her moving prayer of Thanksgiving for victory in 1588, was scrupulous in ascribing no credit to military expertise. She praised rather the favor of God and his wisdom in dividing the world into four elements, "which all, when of thy most singular bounty, and never yerst seen care, thou hast this year made serve for instruments to daunt our foes."'16 The drama endorsed and exploited the view that England benefited from direct divine protection. In Robert Wilson's The Three Lords and Three Ladies of London (London, 1590), a lady representing London appears with "two Angels before her, and two after her with bright Rapiers in their handes," giving entire credit for her deliverance to God's favor and not to "mens strength, and pollecie and wit" (sig. A2v).
Richard In must, politically speaking at least, have been one of the easiest plays for Shakespeare to write, even though it entailed the killing of a king.17 Tudor historians had amply vindicated Henry Tudor. They had not, however, supplied the dramatically crucial details for the politically "safe" implementation of his success. Shakespeare found this implementation in the pure form of divinely inspired victory just described. In the chronicles, Richmond is not a strong character, but neither is he without virtui and political finesse. He is certainly not militarily a passive instrument. At Bosworth Field, for example, he employs a stratagem so that the sun will be at his back and in the faces of his enemies. No hint of a stratagem occurs in Shakespeare. Richmond seems, as God's corrective war approaches, to appear out of nowhere, not as an individual ego (which he is in Holinshed) but as a disembodied force whose instrumentality is scarcely needed. He is militarily almost innocent, "never trained up in arms" (v.iii.273). Richard II, by contrast, is a strong fighter, is strategic, and has great numbers on his side, thrice the force of Richmond. He gives detailed, expert orders for marshaling his troops; surveys "the vantage of the ground" (v.iii.19), which in Holinshed had been done by Richmond; and commands (11. 16-18):
Call for some men of sound direction: Let's want no discipline, make no delay; For, lords, to-morrow is a busy day.
In none of his preparations for war is there any reference to God. Rather, "Our strong arms be our consciences, swords our law" (v.iii.311).
Richmond, on the other hand, refers almost exclusively to God's total dispensation rather than military concerns. As comfort against the frightening odds, his supporter Oxford states that No reference to God appears in these directives. Nevertheless, the increasing reliance on second causes did not mean that God was forgotten or that victory should not be piously acknowledged. To report the political realities only is to scant the more subtle, confusing, and theoretical complications that formed the basis for the new official and public Tudor doctrine of the relationship of God and war. In England the shaking of the early Tudor position was hesitant, and seems to have been undertaken, not always willingly, mostly by men close to the realities of contemporary warfare. George Gascoigne, a learned soldier, provides one of the most troubled examples of growing perplexity over established doctrine when he tries to account for the shocking fall of Antwerp to the Spaniards. His persistent thesis is a conventionally pious one. Let us, he writes, "learne out of this rewfull tragedie to detest and avoyde those synnes, and prowde enormities, which caused the wrath of God to be so furiouslye kindled"; yet he adds in the same sentence, let us "learne to looke better about us for good order & direction, the lacke whereof was theyr overthrow." Gascoigne refers worriedly again and again to the paradox he cannot resolve: "But whosoever wil therein most extoll the Spanyardes for their vallure and order, must therewithall confesse that it was the very ordinance of god for a just plague and scourge unto the towne. The acceptance of the new, realistic point of view was characteristically based always on biblical reasoning, and God's ability to prevail without human assistance was never doubted. The radical change in attitude was an increased weight placed upon human obligation for reasonable action. Events were interpreted more and more in terms of the second causes which Ralegh felt were "nothing largely described" in Scripture. The concurrence of religious writers in the new view of history and current preparedness, slow in coming, demonstrated a reluctance to emphasize second causes, but divines did, as inconspicuously as possible, concede almost completely. John Norden, at the time of the crisis that affected Richard II, wrote that although the Spaniards are deceived in thinking the English unprepared, "God is seene to bee strong in weakness: yet for that we stand not upon myracles now, we no doubt are so sufficiently provided in all things, as behooveth watchfull Christians."30 Even the adamant Gibbon, preaching at the same time, devotes an emphatic section to reassuring his congregation of the tactical weakness of the Spaniards, though he finds it necessary to add "a more morall reason" for his assurance: "be he never so mightie, it is but an arme of flesh, they can do no more then men" (sig. G3").
The foregoing survey of the change in English thought up to about the year 1596 is essential to our understanding of the unprecedentedly complex view of warfare taken in Richard Ii. As opposed to the simple doctrinal basis of Richard III, Richard II probably required more wary thought than Shakespeare ever before or ever after had to give a play; and much of the wariness was demanded by the means through which Richard loses and Bolingbroke wins.
Two major statements of Tudor doctrine are made by Richard in the play. One is that no anointed king can be deposed by man; the other, closely related, is that God will defend his divinely ordained king by miraculous means, "for Heaven still guards the right" (I.iii.62). Both of these seem to be disproved by the action of the play, and both are made dramatically disturbing. The second doctrinal statement, however, has been generally overlooked in criticism, whereas it should be of especial concern because it is Shakespeare's contribution to history and because in Holinshed Richard is not shown to be the militarily inept, passive figure that he is in the play. He moves expeditiously in defense after landing at Barkloughly in Wales, amazed at the great forces rallying to Bolingbroke and the hatred of the people. Until the situation became hopeless he moved with "good courage." Holinshed, moreover, attributes the delay in leaving Ireland, which he considers the major reason for Richard's defeat, not to the King but to Aumerle, though the delay was for a good strategic reason. Although in Shakespeare there are, as the religious view of war would approve, fundamentally moral reasons for Richard's overthrow, the efficient cause is certainly a too passive trust in a good Tudor doctrine. The earth will help him as it did the Hebrews; for every rebel soldier, God has "in heavenly pay / A glorious angel" (iii.ii.60-61); God is mustering "Armies of pestilence" (iII.iii.87)-all the supernatural means, in fact, that we have seen in the early Tudor treatises. Had this been Richard II, we might have surmised that Shakespeare was doing to the "historical" Richard II what he had done to Richmond: making him a gentler, passive man in order to show God's power more miraculously at work. And certainly we have here the appropriately pious words to support such an interpretation. But God does not intervene for Richard. Instead, a man who pronounces none of the conventional pieties; who takes affairs into his own hands; who instead of glorious angels to fight for him has "press'd" men; who relies upon "shrewd steel" and "hard bright steel"; who with sinister, suppressed power has his troops march silently before the castle, while hinting at the need of laying the summer's dust with showers of blood-such a man, without ever praying to be a minister of correction, prevails. Indeed, Bolingbroke's success, as Irving Ribner has demonstrated, is due to his being a "true" Machiavellian.31 With so darkly unconventional a basis for military success, the play raises the big question of how Shakespeare meant us to take Richard's reliance upon God in his unsuccessful war. Respected critics have seen irony in Richard's futile dependence, an irony that is deepened by the ardor with which it is expressed. In so politically sensitive a play we must rather ask whether Shakespeare would expose a governmental and theological ideal to ridicule.
Although I have no answer comprehensive enough to explain the political problems in Shakespeare's most hazardous play, I would, at the very least, suggest that Shakespeare was not subjecting governmental policy to irony. Had the play been written several years earlier, the powerful rhetoric of III.ii might have thrilled audiences with conviction, and the subsequent disillusionment would have been alarming and impious. Richard II is a later play, later not only in English military experience but in Shakespeare's own intellectual development, a play more alert to a changing theory of God and war. A sacrosanct theory is not being ridiculed. Instead, a nostalgic, almost discredited theory is voiced by a mistaken character, one who is repeatedly wrong in his point of view.
Shakespeare assigns the repudiation of the moribund theory not simply to casual events but to a religious spokesman, the Bishop of Carlisle:
The means that heaven yields must be embraced, And not neglected; else, if heaven would Lancaster's godly "stratagem" has caused more indignant questioning of his sincerity than any other in Shakespeare. But Lancaster is a gratifyingly simple instance of hardheaded overt policy compared with his elder brother in Henry V. King Henry is surely the most subtly disturbing study in religious warfare that Shakespeare ever createdan outrage to romantic critics and a burden on the student investigating the apparently diverging paths taken by God and war in Shakespeare's developing thought. Superficially, Henry would seem to be a sharp about-turn in Shakespeare's trend toward less reliance on God and more on man's military tactics. In the first tetralogy, stratagems were of little avail; Fortune or God, or both, decided the outcome. In the Henry VI plays the stratagems were numerous, but their very quantity merely served to emphasize their futility. In Richard ill there are no stratagems; the successful minister of God arrogated nothing to himself by way of human ingenuity. Henry is unquestionably a religious man. His soliloquy on the night before the battle of Agincourt (iv.i.306-33) cannot be intended for a public impression. Nevertheless one can gravely question whether the war is won, as he repeatedly claims, by God's arm alone. The stratagems are concealed like the steel beneath the velvet, and are thus all the more effective though not engaging. Henry, in his devotions, remains always a muscular saint. One is left with the impression that he uses God instead of being helped by God. The one thing that could redeem him would be if he could say, as did Gloucester, "I am myself alone," thereby acknowledging that he has had to rely, in a new age of warfare, upon his own courage and manliness, still giving credit to a God who can scarcely make a divine minister of the son of a tainted ruler.
In this essay I have tried to suggest that Shakespeare's legacy was complex, difficult, variable, and-not the less for these qualities-crucially formative. As a current of thought, rather than a static idea, the legacy demanded of him a reexamination of his historical materials. This intellectual and topical current was more often alternating than direct, as most intellectual advances tend to be. Certainly, Shakespeare's own artistic advances in the military philosophy behind the history plays cannot be synchronized with a steady trend of topical change, whether direct or fluctuating. I suggest only that it gave him, at critical moments, important ideas to which he creatively responded and to which he felt compelled to give dramatic form.
If there is any discernible direction in the current, it is toward a greater emphasis upon second causes, especially human responsibility, in determining the military outcome of political issues. This aspect of the legacy was artistically advantageous, for it demanded--at a time when Shakespeare was natively inclined to respond to the challenge--more interesting action and, above all, richer and more enigmatic characterization.
As possibly its greatest service, the legacy encouraged the early Shakespeare to give hard thought to important questions about the roles o1 God and Fortune in man's destiny. It was as artistically demanding and formative as other legacies with equally unresolvable conflicts: revenge tragedy interacting with Christian ethics, or astrology and fate interacting with moral choice. In its modest way it prepared Shakespeare for great tragic fictions in which the resolution must be found in outcomes deeper than those of military victory or defeat. 
